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A number of studies have considered the evaluation of efficiency in higher education 
institutions. In this paper we focus on the issue of revenue efficiency, in particular 
ascertaining the extent to which, given output prices, producers choose the revenue 
maximising vector of outputs. Following Johnson and Ruggiero (2011), we then relax the 
price taking assumption to consider the case in which the market for some outputs is 
characterised by monopolistic competition. We evaluate efficiencies for English institutions 
of higher education for the academic year 2012-13 and find considerable variation across 
institutions in revenue efficiency. The relaxation of the price taking assumption leads to 
relatively small changes, in either direction, to the estimated revenue efficiency scores. A 
number of issues surrounding the modelling process are raised and discussed, including the 
determination of the demand function for each type of output and the selection of inputs and 
outputs to be used in the model.   
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1. Introduction 
 
The evaluation of efficiency comes in many different flavours. The seminal work of Farrell 
(1957) evolved in contributions by Boles (1971) and Førsund and Hjalmarsson (1974) to 
produce the workhorse model of data envelopment analysis (DEA) popularised by Charnes et 
al. (1978). An early refinement of this model introduced consideration of variable returns to 
scale (Banker et al., 1984) – the so-called BCC model. Meanwhile, building on the early 
contribution of Leibenstein (1966), Färe et al. (1994) developed a host of linear programming 
methods that allowed investigation of further aspects of efficiency, in particular introducing 
prices and the notion of allocative efficiency into the model.  
 
These techniques have come into widespread use, particularly in contexts where production is 
complex, involving a multiplicity of inputs and outputs, and where – as is common in public 
service settings – producers are heterogeneous in terms of their objectives. One such area is 
that of higher education, where different providers vary in the weights they attach to different 
outcomes that are of relevance to society – teaching and research in a variety of subject areas. 
The analysis of efficiency in this sector is facilitated by the existence of good data sources. It 
is not surprising, therefore, that we have witnessed a proliferation of studies concerning the 
efficiency of universities (Athanassopoulos and Shale, 1997; Agasisti and Johnes, 2009; 
Agasisti, 2011).  
 
These studies have, however, typically focused on technical and scale efficiency, and have 
not been extended to examine allocative efficiency. This has been largely due to data 
limitations. To examine the extent to which institutions are responding appropriately to 
market signals in choosing their output vectors we need data on prices, in particular on tuition 
fees. Official data sets have not routinely reported this information. Our aim in the present 
paper is to exploit a new source of such data for universities in England, namely the Reddin 
Tuition Fee Survey.1  This allows us to consider allocative efficiency using the model of Färe 
et al. (1994, p.113). We go further, however, by considering the possibility that universities 
might, in at least some of the markets in which they operate, be price makers rather than price 
takers. The Färe et al. (1994) model implicitly assumes perfect competition; more recent 
work, by Johnson and Ruggiero (2011) allows the possibility that there is monopolistic 
competition so that producers face downward sloping demand curves for their output. This 
means that, in adjusting their output vectors, they must, when seeking to maximise their 
revenue, take into account the impact that this has on the prices that they can charge. We 
know from the literature (see, for example, Gallet, 2007) that the demand for the output of a 
typical higher education institution has some measure of price sensitivity, and so it is 
appropriate to accommodate this feature into our models, and into our evaluation of 
institutions’ efficiency.  
 
The paper proceeds as follows. In the next section, we describe the linear programming 
models that will be used to evaluate the various efficiency measures of interest. In section 3, 
we introduce the sources of data used. This is followed by an analytical section in which 
results are presented and discussed. The paper ends with a conclusion and suggestions for 
further research.  
                                                     
1 Mike Reddin, a lecturer in social policy at the LSE, compiled information about university tuition fees from 
2002 onwards. Since his death in 2011, the data have been compiled by the Complete University Guide, one of 
the producers of university rankings in the UK. Participation in the survey is voluntary for the universities, and 
has increased sharply in recent years. So, while the survey itself has quite a long history, it is only recently that 
the data have become useful for an exercise of the type attempted here. 
 
 
2. Modelling strategy 
 
DEA models involve evaluating the relative efficiency of producers or ‘decision making 
units’ that employ multiple inputs to produce multiple outputs. The method is non-parametric 
in that the objective for each producer is optimised by selection of a producer-specific vector 
of weights on inputs and outputs.  
 
The primal of an output-oriented DEA involves solving a set of linear programs that choose, 
separately for each decision making unit, values of input and output weights to minimise the 
weighted sum of inputs required to produce given output, subject to the constraint that the 
weights chosen should not for any unit imply that the ratio of weighted output to weighted 
input exceeds one. The BCC variant of the model adds a further constraint to allow 
identification of inefficiencies due to operation at scale that is below or above the optimum. 
In its dual form, the linear programming problem is given by 
 
Ei = maxλ,θ θ           (1) 
 
s.t. ∑ λ𝑙𝑙𝑦𝑦𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑁𝑁𝑙𝑙=1 ≥ θyij  j = 1,…,S 
 
 ∑ λ𝑙𝑙𝑥𝑥𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑁𝑁𝑙𝑙=1 ≤ xik   k = 1,…,M 
 
 ∑ λ𝑙𝑙𝑁𝑁𝑙𝑙=1 = 1 
 
 λl ≥ 0  ∀ l = 1,…,N. 
 
where i = 1,…,N are the producers, each of which M inputs, x1,…,xM, to produce S outputs, 
y1,…,yS. 
 
Note that this problem does not involve any consideration of prices. If producers face prices 
for their inputs and outputs that differ from the (producer-specific) weights that are the 
solution to the linear programming problem, then an apparently efficient producer will likely 
produce quantities of output that do not serve to maximise its revenue. The problem of 
revenue maximisation has been addressed by Färe et al. (1994, p.113) for the case in which 
the ith producer faces prices for its outputs given by pi = (pi1,…,piS). Given its production 
technology, this producer will maximise its revenue by solving the problem 
 
R*i =max𝑦𝑦𝑗𝑗,λ∑ 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑦𝑦𝑙𝑙𝑆𝑆𝑙𝑙=1          (2) 
 
s.t. ∑ λ𝑙𝑙𝑦𝑦𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑁𝑁𝑙𝑙=1 ≥ yj   j = 1,…,S 
 
 ∑ λ𝑙𝑙𝑥𝑥𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑁𝑁𝑙𝑙=1 ≤ xik   k = 1,…,M 
 
 ∑ λ𝑙𝑙𝑁𝑁𝑙𝑙=1 = 1 
 
 λl ≥ 0  ∀ l = 1,…,N. 
 
 
The ratio Ri*/∑𝑆𝑆𝑙𝑙=1  pijyij ≥ 1 is a measure of the output revenue efficiency. A score of 1 
indicates that the producer is revenue efficient, while scores in excess of 1 indicate allocative 
inefficiency; in this case switching activity from one output to another, given inputs, could 
yield higher than outturn revenues.  
 
A variety of models has been developed that pursue further the concept of revenue efficiency. 
Some of these focus on directional distance functions, in some cases employing slacks-based 
measures (Aparicio et al., 2013, 2015; Sahoo et al., 2014; Tone, 2002). Others (such as 
Mozaffari et al., 2014) compare conventional DEA methods with a ratio approach that 
imposes more structure on the models; in practice these approaches appear to have only a 
minor effect on measured efficiency. Meanwhile, Oliveira et al. (2013) eschew the 
nonparametric approach altogether in order to analyse revenue efficiency using a stochastic 
frontier.  
 
Here, however, we consider the Johnson and Ruggiero (2011) model that notes the implicit 
assumption of the Färe et al. (1994) model that producers are price takers may not hold good 
in practice. In particular, firms may, for some of their outputs at least, face a downward 
sloping demand schedule; if they raise their price, consumers may transfer their custom to 
another producer. This would, for example, be in line with a market structure characterised 
by monopolistic competition.2 In the context of English higher education institutions, we note 
that providers have discretion over the tuition fees they charge in particular for overseas 
students – and so in the analysis that follows we shall assume a downward sloping demand 
curve for such students (while continuing to assume that institutions are price takers for 
students from the United Kingdom and other EU countries). The Johnson and Ruggiero 
(2011) model is given by 
 
R*i =max𝑦𝑦𝑗𝑗,λ∑ 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑙𝑙(𝑦𝑦𝑙𝑙)𝑦𝑦𝑙𝑙𝑆𝑆𝑙𝑙=1          (3) 
 
s.t. ∑ λ𝑙𝑙𝑦𝑦𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑁𝑁𝑙𝑙=1 ≥ yj   j = 1,…,S 
 
 ∑ λ𝑙𝑙𝑥𝑥𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑁𝑁𝑙𝑙=1 ≤ xik   k = 1,…,M 
 
 ∑ λ𝑙𝑙𝑁𝑁𝑙𝑙=1 = 1 
 
 λl ≥ 0  ∀ l = 1,…,N. 
 
 
This requires precise specification of the inverse demand function, pij(yj), faced by each 
institution for each output for which the institution is not a price taker. While estimates of the 
own price elasticity of demand for higher education vary across studies, we use -0.8 as a 
central estimate, and later check the robustness of our results to variation in this figure  
(Wohlgemuth, 2013; Langella, 2016). We then construct a linear demand function for the ith 
provider and the jth output that passes through the observed price-quantity pairing and that 
has elasticity of -0.8 at this point. So for each output type, different demand curves are faced 
by different institutions; this is attributed to secular shift factors.  Hence the inverse demand 
curve for the jth output produced by the ith institution is given by 
                                                     
2 Markets may plausibly be oligopolistic rather than monopolistically competitive, of course, though the 
modelling in the case of such market structures would be complicated by interdependence. 
 
pij = 2.25p0ij – 1.25(p0ij/y0ij)yij         (4) 
 
where p0ij and y0ij represent the (given) observed values of price and output respectively. 
Clearly any number of alternative assumptions could conceivably be made about the shape of 
the demand functions, and, given heterogeneity across institutions, there is no straightforward 
way of estimating a unique demand curve along which all observations will lie. Note also 
that, in (4), we have made pij a function of yij, rather than of yj as in (3). We therefore 
consider the results based upon our preferred assumption to be instructive but illustrative.3  
 
Once the above programming problem has been solved, the output revenue efficiency 
associated with the Johnson and Ruggiero (2011) model can be calculated in an analogous 





The richness of higher education institutions as producers derives from the multiplicity of 
outputs produced; indeed the term ‘university’ reflects the provision by a single entity of 
expertise drawn from the full range of knowledge. Many studies thus focus on teaching and 
research as distinct outputs. In the present exercise, we focus rather on the various types of 
teaching provision, and include also research activity, measured by the level of grant income 
supporting research projects. 
 
Teaching is undertaken at a variety of levels (undergraduate, postgraduate) in a variety of 
subject areas (which have different implications for costs – classroom based subjects, 
laboratory based subjects, mixed subjects, clinical subjects) and to students from a variety of 
backgrounds. In England, tuition fees may be set at different levels for students based in the 
United Kingdom and in the rest of the European Union (EU), on the one hand, and for 
students based outside the EU (so-called ‘overseas’ students) on the other.  
 
While we have data on student numbers and tuition fees for clinical medicine, we exclude 
these from the analysis that follows – that is, we do not include clinical students as outputs, 
and we subtract expenditure on them from the data on university spending – because many 
universities have no provision in this subject area at all. The linear programming methods 
used in the present paper fail if there are zeros in the data, so it would not be possible to 
evaluate models in which both universities that provide tuition in the clinical subject areas 
and those that do not appear.  
 
Institutions are free to set tuition fees at whatever level they choose for overseas students. 
Typically they charge different fees for different subjects. We therefore consider as separate 
outputs overseas students in classroom based subjects, laboratory based subjects and mixed 
subjects. We separate these out into those studying for undergraduate and those studying for 
postgraduate degrees. In addition to these six outputs, we consider two further teaching 
outputs: home and EU (HEU) undergraduate students and HEU postgraduate students. 
Finally we consider research activity (measured by research grants) as an output. 
                                                     
3 Johnson and Ruggiero (2011) provide a stylised example of how their model might work in practice, 
calculating revenue efficiency for just one decision making unit. A contribution of the present paper is to 
operationalise their method by introducing the assumption that the demand function for each output type applies 
to institutions with a shifter due to institutional heterogeneity.  
 
Institutions may charge tuition fees of up to £9000 per year to HEU undergraduates; because 
of technicalities within the funding mechanism, most charge the full £9000 to all students, 
regardless of subject of study.4 We do not, therefore, separate out HEU students by subject 
area. Furthermore, while institutions are able to differentiate their fees by subject for HEU 
postgraduates, we consider these too to be a single output; they are relatively small in 
number, and, in particular for those undertaking doctoral study, many universities choose to 
set tuition fees close to or at levels that are reimbursed by research councils.  When 
evaluating the Johnson and Ruggiero (2011) model, we shall assume that institutions face a 
downward sloping demand function for the six outputs that measure overseas students, but 
that they are price takers for HEU students and research.   
 
We assume that these nine outputs are produced using a single input, namely expenditure 
(minus, as noted above, spending on provision in clinical subject areas). While the sample of 
universities is not particularly large, the rule of thumb that the number of observations in a 
DEA exercise should equal at least max{MS, 3(M+S)} is comfortably met (Cooper et al., 
2007, p.116). 
 
All data used in the present study refer to English higher education institutions in the 
academic year 2012-13. This is, at the time of writing, the latest year for which data on 
student numbers and finance are available; these data come from the official publications of 
the Higher Education Statistics Agency (HESA), respectively Students in Higher Education 
Institutions and Finances of Higher Education Institutions. Student numbers refer to full-time 
equivalent numbers, obtained by attaching a 0.5 weight to part-time students. Data on the 
numbers of overseas students by institution and by subject area are unpublished, and were 
obtained by direct request to HESA. The data on tuition fees are obtained from the Reddin 
survey.5  
 
As noted earlier, the Reddin data do not cover all institutions, but they do represent the only 
opportunity, at this stage, to use price data to evaluate allocative efficiency in English higher 
education.6 Table 1 reports descriptive statistics for the main variables used in our analysis. 
The scale of institutions, as measured by the standard deviations of the student numbers and 
costs variables relative to the corresponding means, clearly varies considerably within the 
sample. It is instructive to compare the descriptive statistics with the broad characteristics of 
the population of higher education institutions in England – for which the average number of 
undergraduates and postgraduates were 10234 and 2674 respectively in 2012-13. These 
figures are slightly lower than those reported in Table 1, but the discrepancy is not large 
enough to suggest that our sample is anything other than representative of the population of 
institutions.  
                                                     
4 Students receive an income-contingent loan that enables them to pay the tuition fees. Repayments are made 
through the tax system once the student has graduated and earns over a threshold level of annual income. 
Graduates continue repaying until their loan is paid off, or until it is written off. The latter happens 30 years 
after graduation, the cost of this falling on the taxpayer. Many prospective students will not expect to repay the 
full value of their loan, and so are indifferent between tuition fees of £9000 per annum or less. Since the 
institutions receive the full tuition fee, they have the incentive to charge up to the limit. 
5 For a small number of institutions, the Reddin data do not report tuition fees for overseas students in mixed 
subjects; for these cases, fees are assumed equal to those charged for classroom based subjects. Likewise, in a 
small number of cases, fees are presented as a range; in these cases the mid-point has been used. 
6 Three institutions, University College Birmingham, Canterbury Christ Church University and Newman 
Univeristy, appear in the Reddin data but are not in the sample of institutions investigated here. They are 
excluded from our sample because they report zero values of some outputs.  
 
The sample includes institutions of various vintages. Neither of the ancient universities 
(Oxford and Cambridge) is in the data, but older civic universities in the ‘Russell Group’ of 
elite institutions are. These include, for example, Manchester, Nottingham and Newcastle. 
The sample also includes smaller research intensive universities created in the 1960s. Many 
of these were formerly members of the 1994 Group of universities. They include ‘greenfield’ 
institutions such as Essex and the University of East Anglia, and also former Colleges of 
Advanced Technology such as Loughborough and Surrey. In 1992, numerous institutions 
were converted from polytechnics to universities; these retain a strong teaching focus, but are 
increasingly engaged in research, often of an applied nature. In our sample, examples of such 
institutions include Manchester Metropolitan, Nottingham Trent, and Oxford Brookes. 
Finally, a new wave of institutions that attained university status in the current century is 





The three models discussed above have been evaluated using an amended version of the SAS 
program that is reproduced in Blackburn et al. (2014, ch.2.4). The results appear in Table 2.  
 
The BCC efficiency scores suggest a high level of efficiency across the institutions in our 
sample. Indeed, some 28 of the 40 institutions have scores of unity. Of the remainder, most 
are close to one. The highest score is for Loughborough, at 1.21. There is no systematic 
variation across type of institution as defined by vintage.  
 
The results suggest that institutions that appear to be technically efficient as defined by the 
BCC model can nonetheless suffer from quite high levels of revenue inefficiency as 
evaluated by the Färe et al. (1994) measure. Several London institutions – City, Goldsmiths, 
and the LSE – stand out in this respect. Their positions within a system of institutions in a 
large urban area may compromise the extent to which they can make choices about subject 
mix. A fourth London institution, Queen Mary College, also has a revenue inefficiency score 
that is high in relation to its score on the BCC measure. Taking this institution as an example, 
it is instructive to observe how the efficient levels of output, calculated using the Färe et al. 
(1994) method, differ from the outturn. The institution would maximise efficiency by taking 
on (considerably) more HEU undergraduate students and HEU postgraduates, and by 
admitting fewer overseas students (in all categories except postgraduates in classroom based 
subjects). There are, of course, constraints that prevent the institution from doing this in 
practice. In particular, until 2015-16, institutions faced regulatory controls that prevented 
them from choosing the number of HEU undergraduates that they could recruit. 
 
Indeed, if we examine the 12 least revenue efficient institutions on the Johnson and Ruggiero 
(2011) measure – all of which are pre-1992 institutions – the efficient output vector implies 
that they should enrol an average of 21499 HEU undergraduates (see Table 3). This compares 
with an outturn of just 7803. By way of contrast, the five universities that are most revenue 
efficient – which include two of the largest three institutions in the country (Manchester 
Metropolitan and Manchester) enrol an average of 13611 HEU undergraduates – very close 
to the level that maximises revenue for these universities. We might therefore expect the 
impact of the removal of the cap on student numbers to be, over time, substantial growth in 
HEU undergraduate numbers in the least revenue efficient institutions – typically smaller, 
research intensive, universities.7  
 
As a whole, the Johnson and Ruggiero (2011) efficiencies are not hugely different from those 
obtained using the Färe et al. (1994) measure. To a large extent this is because we are 
assuming institutions to be price takers for HEU students, and these represent the majority of 
students. It might also, however, be due to the assumption made about the price elasticity of 
demand; while our assumption is in line with estimates drawn from the literature, it is 
instructive to consider what the results might look like if alternative assumptions are made. 
To this end, we report, in Table 4, the Johnson and Ruggiero (2011) efficiencies that are 
obtained when the assumption of a demand elasticity of -0.8 is replaced by assuming a figure 
of -0.5. As is readily observed the inefficiency scores typically rise, but the increase is small.  
 
Given the relatively inelastic nature of demand at the observed price and output values, it is 
always the case that, in the Johnson and Ruggiero (2011) model, the prices associated with 
revenue efficiency exceed the outturn prices for those outputs facing a downward sloping 
demand schedule. This may or may not imply that the output levels themselves are lower than 
are implied by efficiency in the Färe et al. (1994) model. In most situations, the Johnson and 
Ruggiero (2011) levels of efficient output are lower than is the case in the Färe et al. (1994) 
model. But in cases where the efficient level of production of a particular output type is, 
according to the Färe et al. (1994) model, lower than the outturn output, the price-output 
pairing is below the demand schedule and it is therefore possible that the optimal pairing 







To the best of our knowledge, this paper represents the first attempt to evaluate the revenue 
efficiency of institutions of higher education. This supplements what we already know about 
technical and scale efficiency by providing further information about allocative efficiency, 
grafting onto existing information sets data on prices. Some institutions that appear to be 
good performers, relative to their peers, in terms of scale and technical efficiency are seen to 
be less successful at ensuring that their inputs are directed in an optimal fashion toward the 
production of outputs that, given prices, are most remunerative. This analysis might therefore 
serve to steer such institutions in the direction of more revenue efficient behaviour. We do 
not suggest that institutions are necessarily revenue maximisers; rather we use the revenue 
maximisation model as a means of ascertaining how closely each institution’s behaviour 
matches that of a revenue maximiser. 
 
In conducting this analysis, we have recognised that institutions are not necessarily price 
takers in connection with all types of output that they produce. Building on the work of 
Johnson and Ruggiero (2011), we have examined the implications for revenue efficiency 
measures of assuming that institutions face downward sloping demand curves for (most of) 
their outputs. In practice the effects appear to be quite small, but we acknowledge that this 
                                                     
7 A similar finding, suggesting that universities may switch activity from postgraduate to undergraduate 
following the raising of the cap on HEU undergraduate tuition fees, is due to Johnes (2014).  
might be the result of the specific assumptions employed here. Further research is therefore 
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Note: The table reports averages, with standard deviations in parentheses.  
 
  
Table 2: Efficiency scores 
University  BCC Färe et al Johnson & Ruggiero 
Birmingham 1.00 1.11 1.09 
Bolton 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Bournemouth 1.01 1.13 1.06 
Bradford 1.14 1.37 1.31 
UCLAN 1.00 1.04 1.05 
City 1.00 1.63 1.68 
Coventry 1.00 1.08 1.13 
Derby 1.14 1.34 1.24 
Durham 1.10 1.42 1.45 
East Anglia 1.00 1.43 1.47 
Essex 1.00 1.30 1.32 
Goldsmiths 1.00 1.63 1.42 
Hull 1.00 1.22 1.25 
Imperial 1.00 1.15 1.00 
Kent 1.00 1.23 1.27 
Leeds Beckett 1.00 1.04 1.02 
Leeds 1.00 1.08 1.02 
Lincoln 1.10 1.30 1.18 
LSE 1.00 1.72 1.76 
Loughborough 1.21 1.49 1.51 
Manchester Metropolitan 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Manchester  1.00 1.00 1.00 
Middlesex 1.00 1.20 1.22 
Newcastle 1.03 1.19 1.23 
Northumbria 1.00 1.14 1.18 
Nottingham Trent 1.00 1.05 1.07 
Nottingham 1.00 1.00 1.03 
Oxford Brookes 1.04 1.38 1.39 
Plymouth 1.00 1.05 1.07 
Portsmouth 1.00 1.13 1.16 
Queen Mary College 1.12 1.44 1.44 
Salford 1.09 1.33 1.33 
Sheffield 1.00 1.11 1.13 
Southampton Solent 1.00 1.33 1.22 
Sunderland 1.00 1.28 1.33 
Surrey 1.07 1.61 1.67 
Sussex 1.06 1.48 1.51 
UCL 1.00 1.00 1.00 
West London 1.00 1.00 1.02 
Winchester 1.00 1.20 1.13 
 
  
Table 3 Revenue efficient numbers of HEU undergraduates, selected institutions 
University Revenue efficient Outturn 
City 21257 6860 
Durham 24340 10598 
East Anglia 23367 9987 
Goldsmiths 9142 4210 
LSE 24520 2487 
Loughborough 24524 10503 
Queen Mary College 24130 9465 
Surrey 22317 7945 
Sussex 19892 8168 
   
Bolton 4975 4975 
Imperial 8506 6460 
Manchester Metropolitan 24525 24525 
Manchester 18803 21855 
UCL 10240 10240 
Note: The revenue efficient numbers for Imperial and Manchester differ from the outturn 
because, before rounding, the revenue efficiency for these institutions is greater than one. 
  
Table 4 Johnson and Ruggiero efficiency scores with alternative elasticity assumption 
University  Efficiency score University Efficiency score 
Birmingham 1.12 Manchester Metropolitan 1.01 
Bolton 1.01 Manchester  1.03 
Bournemouth 1.07 Middlesex 1.26 
Bradford 1.33 Newcastle 1.25 
UCLAN 1.06 Northumbria 1.20 
City 1.72 Nottingham Trent 1.09 
Coventry 1.17 Nottingham 1.06 
Derby 1.25 Oxford Brookes 1.41 
Durham 1.48 Plymouth 1.08 
East Anglia 1.50 Portsmouth 1.18 
Essex 1.34 Queen Mary College 1.46 
Goldsmiths 1.45 Salford 1.34 
Hull 1.28 Sheffield 1.17 
Imperial 1.02 Southampton Solent 1.24 
Kent 1.30 Sunderland 1.37 
Leeds Beckett 1.03 Surrey 1.71 
Leeds 1.04 Sussex 1.56 
Lincoln 1.19 UCL 1.02 
LSE 1.80 West London 1.06 
Loughborough 1.53 Winchester 1.14 
 
